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1. Introduction
Status is an important determinant for human behavior, a proposition supported by psy-
chologists and economists alike (e.g. Frank, 1988, Huberman et al., 2004, Moldovanu et al.,
2007). Status concerns are particularly important at work; people spend much of their time
at the workplace, and their behavior at work is an important determinant of an economy’s
efficiency. The goal of gaining higher status in an organization motivates people to work hard
for long periods of time; examples from the academic world, law firms, investment banks,
and consulting firms abound. Making partner at a law firm, or getting tenure in a university
provides much stronger motivation than just getting a wage rise.
Chester Barnard (1938, p.145), the first modern management theorist, was well aware of
the relevance of status for motivation and the necessity to provide both monetary rewards
and status: ”Even in strictly commercial organizations, where it is least supposed to be true,
money without distinction, prestige, position, is so utterly ineffective that it is rare that
greater income can be made to serve even temporarily as an inducement if accompanied by
suppression of prestige.” Peter Drucker (1954, p. 154) expressed similar thoughts: ”But
financial rewards are not enough. People, whether managers or workers, whether in business
or outside, need rewards of prestige and pride.” Indeed, most organizations do not only
provide monetary incentives, but they also allocate status between workers by giving them
awards, office space, company cars, and, arguably most importantly, promotions. Some of
these attributes also provide material benefits or affect working conditions, whereas others
are purely symbolic and are valued for the social or psychological benefits they entail. While
we acknowledge all of these factors, for the sake of clarity and tractability, in this paper we
focus on the non-material sources of status.
Despite the prominence of status concerns and the widespread use of promotions as a way
to differentiate people’s status, there are relatively few papers in economics investigating the
design of organizations and incentive contracts in the presence of status concerns (Auriol and
Renault 2001, 2008; Moldovanu et al, 2007; Besley and Ghatak, 2008; Marino and Ozbas,
2011).1
Our paper builds on Auriol and Renault (2001, 2008). Auriol and Renault (2008) propose
a general representation of preferences over social status and income where both tend to
reinforce each other. Given these preferences, they show that a principal who can commit
will always offer minimum rewards (both in status and money) to junior employees. Juniors
will be incentivized to work only through the perspective of promotion. Auriol and Renault
(2001) take a particular example of this general framework to derive closed form solutions
of the optimal incentive contract. In these papers, though, workers are homogeneous and
do not get fired, even if they are unsuccessful. In reality, workers differ in their productivity
and people may get fired. In the present paper, we allow for such firing policies as part of
the optimal hierarchy, and compare what has been called “standard promotion practices”
1Status in Auriol and Renault (2001, 2008) and Besley and Ghatak (2008) is different from Moldovanu
et al. (2007), in which money is the source of status. As we are interested in organizational design, it is
natural to focus on rank in a hierarchy as the source for status.
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with the “up-or-out system”.
Going back to Doeringer and Piore (1971), in firms employing standard promotion prac-
tices incentives are given through promotions and wages are associated to job titles (see for
instance, Baker et al., 1994). “Up-or-out” exposes employees to more risk and steeper incen-
tives. Employees work for some years as juniors with the explicit or implicit understanding
that upon completion of this phase, they will either be promoted or will have to leave the
firm.
We derive the two promotion hierarchies as solutions to a simple dynamic agency model,
describe their properties in terms of profits, wages paid to juniors and seniors, and the
ratio between them, the implied span of control. We determine when one or the other is
optimal and generate some empirical predictions. We also consider heterogeneous workers
and endogenize workers’ outside options by considering self-employment opportunities.
An important literature has looked at the rationale for firms to maintain standard pro-
motion practices,2 and up-or-out has attracted much attention among economists as well.3
As in Lazear and Rosen (1981) or in Malcomson (1984), much of the literature on promo-
tion hierarchies argues that tournaments solve contracting issues related to non-verifiable or
hardly measurable output.
Our model is also a tournament model, because successful workers receive increases in
wages and status, but we do not rely on restrictions on the contractibility of output: output
is verifiable and measurable on a cardinal scale. Indeed, in many sectors in which up-or-
out is applied, measures of individual output are observable and verifiable. For instance,
in academia, publications and citations of a researcher are easily verifiable. Although these
might be imperfect measures of productivity, they are employed as a proxy for individual
output and are not only used as the basis for promotion decisions taken by universities, but
also for the allocation of public funds (e.g. in Germany and the UK). Similar measures are
available for the record of investment bankers (the return on the funds invested or the profits
generated) or lawyers (size and frequency of cases won, or clients acquired).
In our model, there is one large firm that offers workers either standard promotion prac-
tices, or up-or-out. Workers can choose to be self-employed or to work in the large firm. Three
different employment forms are hence generated from the same model: self-employment,
standard promotion practices, and up-or-out systems. By working in the promotion hierar-
chy, workers receive the opportunity of gaining additional status. The firm allocates status
among workers by means of job titles or ranks. For incentive purposes, all juniors enjoy the
same low status and successful agents receive a large increase in status through promotions.
In equilibrium, only high-productivity agents enter the large firm and as everyone exerts
the same effort, workers take a status gamble. Self-employment, in which there is no real-
location of status,4 is preferred by less productive workers, because they have little to gain
2For surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), and Waldman
(2009).
3Below we review the relationship to the following papers: Demougin and Siow (1994), O’Flaherty and
Siow (1995), Kahn and Huberman (1988), Waldman (1990), Ghosh and Waldman (2010).
4Notice that we are not saying that there are no social status concerns of self-employed, as the market
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from competing for status and incentive pay with more productive types. Note that in our
framework we do not consider highly visible entrepreneurs like Bill Gates and Mark Zucker-
berg, who are the principals of large corporations. Instead, we have in mind self-employed
entrepreneurs with low visibility working on their own and employing no one else.5 Thus,
promotion hierarchies function as a screening device ensuring that only productive workers
enter a firm, and firms make profits by using promotion hierarchies.6
The large firm makes profits because junior workers receive wages below the output they
produce. They enjoy little status, but they face steep incentives by the prospect of receiving
both a large fixed wage, a substantial bonus and high status in the firm when promoted
upon a success. Thus, both junior and senior workers are exerting more effort than in
self-employment. These productivity gains are shared between the firm and the successful
workers who are promoted. An entrepreneur who would hire only one worker or hire more
than one worker without differentiating their status would not make profits because workers
have the alternative to be self-employed. In the absence of status differentiation, the optimal
dynamic solution would simply be the replication of the optimal static solution. 7
We derive the optimal incentive and promotion scheme both for standard promotion
practices and for up-or-out systems. We identify the situations in which standard promotion
practices and those in which up-or-out contracts are optimal. We find that in terms of the
profits of the firm, up-or-out is always optimal if it is very difficult to achieve a success.
When success is less hard to achieve, standard promotion practices are optimal provided the
payoff associated with success is small enough. Otherwise up-or-out is, again, optimal.
The intuition of our results is the following: Large firms can exploit the complementarity
between status and income in workers preferences by bundling high status and high income.
This lowers the total wage bill. Wages and status are shifted to the second period of the
professional life to provide the workers with incentives to work, explaining the backloaded
for Rolex or Porsche demonstrates. However, such external symbols are different from the internal status
symbols like promotions. Internal status can be controlled by the firm and is, consequently, an element of
organizational design, which is the focus of our paper.
5These small enterprises are not able to redistribute status inside the firm. Indeed, social status stems
from interpersonal comparisons, in our case embodied in the formal ranking of workers inside the hierarchy
that can be controlled by the principal. There is, however, no possibility to manage social status when one
works alone (i.e., there is nobody to compare with). This is why, with self-employment, social status is fixed.
The model hence compares competition between small and large firms all of which provide status internally.
Small firms are limited in what they can do in terms of status allocation. By contrast, there is ample room
for status manipulation in large firms by assigning ranks. The principal chooses the status allocation to
maximize profit (i.e., she is assumed to care only for profit as shareholders would).
6This is a similar mechanism as the one in von Siemens (2010) in which a firm can prevent inequity-averse
low-ability workers from entering by not compensating them for rent differences within the firm.
7We believe this result to be (technically) interesting because Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) show in the
same setting that the optimal dynamic contract displays memory. We show that their result hinges on the
fact that in their model, the workers’ reservation utility is fixed to 0, implying that only the limited liability
constraint is binding. In our model, however, the outside option of the workers is type-dependent (agents
differ in productivity), so that the participation constraint binds in equilibrium. Given that agents are risk-
neutral and that in the outside option workers receive all of the surplus they produce, the firm cannot do
better than this contract by postponing rewards.
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structure of the dynamic incentive scheme. While it would seem that up-or-out is always
the preferable scheme because it offers steeper incentives to juniors, this is not the case.
In particular, when effort has little value, incentives can be too steep in up-our-out. The
reason is that the firm can only adjust the status of people working inside the company.
Thus, when up-or-out requires unsuccessful juniors to leave, this forces the status of these
workers to the minimum that is earned in self-employment. In turn, the firm needs to give
a higher status and income to successful seniors to fulfill the participation constraint of the
junior workers, at the same time increasing incentives for juniors. Juniors might then spend
too much effort which has to be compensated by the firm. Therefore, when incentives to
juniors are less important and the main driver of profits is the intergenerational redistribution
of status, standard promotion practices based on seniority are preferable.
Our theory generates a number of other predictions. The variance of career success
(measured in wages and status) of a cohort entering a firm with standard promotion practices
should be lower than the one of a cohort entering an up-or-out hierarchy. Juniors should work
harder in up-or-out than with standard promotion practices; while this is not necessarily so
for seniors. The model also predicts differences in the spans of control in up-or-out and with
standard promotion practices: the ratio of juniors and (in the case of standard promotion
practices) unsuccessful seniors over successful (promoted) seniors is smaller in up-or-out than
with standard promotion practices.
In our model, both promotion hierarchies induce sorting with only productive workers
entering the large firm. As we know from the empirical literature (for instance, Lazear, 2000),
firms must be concerned about both, effort provision and sorting of productive workers. We
find it noteworthy that status differentiation serves this double purpose in a similar way as
incentive pay.
The next section relates our paper to the literature; Section 3 sets up the model; Section
4 presents the main results. Section 5 derives implications and discusses the results and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
We share a common interest with the existing papers on up-or-out contracts, but there are
some notable differences, both in terms of underlying assumptions and predictions. First,
Demougin and Siow (1994) and O’Flaherty and Siow (1995) are not about incentives. Rather,
firms decide on either to staff all junior positions with trainees for managerial positions only,
or to staff the junior positions also with people who work productively. Whether or not up-
or-out is optimal depends on demand. In particular, if current demand is low, but growth
is high, up-or-out is optimal. We consider a steady-state organization, and in our theory,
juniors and seniors do the same kind of work, which seems a fair description of law firms,
consulting or academia. The main interest that relates us to Demougin and Siow (1994)
and O’Flaherty and Siow (1995) lies in determining the relative sizes of different hierarchical
levels and, thus, the span of control of hierarchies.
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The second group of papers is on incentives. Kahn and Huberman (1988) suggest a
model in which firms want to incentivize agents to invest in human capital, but there is
limited commitment of the firms. Output is only observable to the firm; it thus may pretend
that the output is not high enough in order to save on the promised reward. This would
undermine the incentive effects of the proposed reward. By announcing that anyone who
does not get the reward will be fired, the firm can commit itself not to cheat, because
otherwise it will lose the accumulated human capital of the worker. The model combines
bilateral moral hazard with the assumption that output cannot be verified. Prendergast
(1993) suggests a model in which promotions, together with wage structures that a firm
can commit itself to, can solve similar problems related to unverifiability and specific human
capital acquisition. The assumption of unverifiable output is also present in Waldman (1984)
and (1990) and in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) in which promotion is a signal to the outside
world about the productivity of a person, while output is not observable to the outside world.
Waldman (1984) introduced this idea and then showed (Waldman, 1990) that the Kahn and
Huberman (1988) model works in a setting with general human capital if promotion as a
signal is considered. Ghosh and Waldman (2010) compare standard promotion practices
with up-or-out, and show that up-or-out is optimal if firm-specific human capital is low.
They also show that if the firm can commit to a wage floor, up-or-out is used when low and
high-level jobs are similar.
An ongoing question in the literature on up-or-out is thus the impact of firm-specific
human capital on the optimal promotion system. While the model of Kahn and Huberman
(1988) predicts that up-or-out should prevail when firm-specific human capital is important,
the model of Ghosh and Waldman (2010) predicts the opposite. Gorman (1999) presents
empirical evidence that is in line with the results in Ghosh and Waldman (2010). We will
argue later that introducing firm-specific human capital in our model would produce similar
results, i.e., up-or-out would become less attractive.
3. Model
We employ an overlapping generation model. At any date, the organization is staffed with
members of two generations. Each person has a work life time of two periods. Juniors
either enter the organization and work their first period or stay out. Seniors who joined the
organization in the previous period may spend the last period of their working life in the
firm, or work in self-employment.8 It is assumed that the population of agents is constant
and large so that it may be represented by a continuum. The size of the workforce employed
by the firm is normalized to 2, that is, we look at a firm in steady state.
8In a similar setup without considering status concerns, Bar-Isaac (2007) examines juniors and seniors
working together in teams to credibly establish a reputation for working hard.
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The risk-neutral organizational designer maximizes the profit over two periods:
2∑
t=1
δtpit =
2∑
t=1
δt (Qt −Wt) . (1)
where Qt is output (its price is normalized to 1 without loss of generality) and Wt is the
wage bill in period t. The principal’s objective function is intertemporally separable with a
discount factor δ ≤ 1. In what follows, we set δ = 1 which is innocuous in our context.
The organizational designer uses two instruments, compensation and allocation of status,
both of which are perfectly observable. Before setting up the full program of the designer, we
describe the production process, workers’ preferences, and the feasible allocations of status.
3.1 Production
Each worker living at date t, junior or senior, exerts an effort eit ≥ 0 through which he
contributes an amount qit to the firm’s output. Workers are hired to do the same type of
work. With probability µ(eit), qit is high (qit = q + ∆q, ∆q > 0), and with probability
1 − µ(eit), qit is low (qit = q). Thus, q is the base-line output, and the total output at
date t, Qt =
∫ 2
0
qitdi, is random. Individual output qit is verifiable and its realization is
independent across time. The probability of high output of agent i, µ(eit), increases with
eit. More specifically we assume that
µ(eit) = min{eit, 1}, ∀eit ≥ 0.
While output qit is ex-post verifiable, the effort level eit is not. There are two types of
workers, g and b. A worker’s type is private information. Type g workers are more productive
than type b workers. The disutility of effort is
ψτ (eit) =
(eit)
2
2
aτ , τ = g, b.
The larger is aτ , the more difficult it is for an agent to achieve a high output.
9 In equilibrium
the probability of success is inversely related to aτ . To capture the idea that g workers are
more productive than b workers we assume that ab > ag > 0.
3.2 Preferences
We assume that utilities are additively separable across periods with some discount factor
(which we will set to one). Workers are protected by limited liability and status and wages
are publicly observable. In any of the periods an agent with productivity of type τ , with
9Equivalently, we could assume µτ (e) = min{ eaτ , 1} and ψτ (e) = e
2
2 , with similar results.
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status s ≥ 0, total income w ≥ 0, and effort level e ≥ 0 has the following utility function:
Uτ (s, w, e) = sw − ψτ (e). (2)
We posit the same utility function as Auriol and Renault (2008), which is situated be-
tween perfect substitutes and perfect complements. The indifference curves for money and
status for a given effort level are strictly decreasing, thus there is some substitution between
status and income. This substitution is however imperfect: a superb job title does not com-
pensate for a wage of nil, nor does a stellar wage make up for a lack of appreciation by others.
The utility function also implies that the marginal rate of substitution between effort and
income is decreasing in status. Put differently, for a given level of monetary incentives, an
agent should be all the more willing to exert effort when she has higher status. Furthermore,
the marginal rate of substitution between effort and status is decreasing in income. Thus,
individuals with higher income will be willing to exert more effort in order to improve their
status. Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs is in line with this, and Centers and Bugental
(1966) find evidence that employees earning higher wages care more for factors at the top of
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
These observations indicate that our assumption is a reasonable one, but direct empirical
evidence on the shape of utility functions is hard to find. While some authors in the literature
on status have conjectured that the complementarities we assume exist (for instance, Necker-
mann and Kosfeld, 2011), systematic evidence about the interplay between status and social
recognition, and money is so far lacking in economics.10 Evidence on the re-enforcement of
money and social recognition exists in industrial psychology. In particular, Stajkovic and
Luthans (2003) carry out a meta-analysis of 72 studies with more than 13,000 subjects. They
find that provided that there is performance feedback (as in our theory in which performance
is common knowledge), monetary incentives and social recognition re-enforce each other, as
postulated in our theory.
3.3 Organizational design
An organization can establish a status ranking of their workers through different means like
the distribution of wages, the allocation of scarce nonmonetary resources, e.g., corner offices,
or, most commonly, the hierarchical structure. Some of these attributes also provide material
benefits, whereas others are purely symbolic and are valued for the social or psychological
benefits they entail. We focus on these non-material sources of status, such as rank in the
organization. In particular, we consider rank as a pure status device rather than a reflection
of different responsibilities (as analyzed by Garicano, 2000) or span of control (as analyzed
by Smeets et al, 2013, both of which are complementary issues to our analysis.
Any organization will be constrained in its allocation decision because increasing one
10A first piece of related evidence is by Bradler and Neckermann (2011) who found that in a field experiment
a monetary reward and a thank-you card increased performance to some limited extent when given in
combination. This, however, is only mild support as a promotion is not given to everyone.
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individual’s status comes at the expense of decreasing somebody else’s status. We thus
assume that status is firm-specific and that each worker is born with one unit of status.
The set of feasible social status allocations is characterized as follows (the equality to 2 is a
normalization).∫ 2
0
sitdi = 2, sit ≥ 0 ∀i, t. (A.1)
For each agent, the organizational designer chooses a social status allocation sit in (A.1),
a fixed wage wit, and a bonus ∆wit in case of a high performance. Status is allocated before
the workers exert effort. When an agent joins the organization he is assigned to a rank in
the hierarchy, which is revised at the end of the first period based on performance.
The assumption that the firm is free to assign status in any possible way is certainly a
strong one. However, a number of papers in psychology (Jemmott and Gonzalez, 1989) and
economics (Ball and Eckel, 1998; Ball et al., 2001) have shown that even perfectly randomly
distributed status affects people’s performance. For instance, Ball et al. (2001) awarded a
”gold star”(a pin) to half of the participants in a standard buyer/seller game. Status was
found to have a significantly positive effect on individuals’ earnings, even though participants
knew that status was awarded on an arbitrary basis.
We will focus on the two promotion hierarchies most commonly observed in practice.
First, in an up-or-out system, successful former juniors are promoted and become seniors,
while unsuccessful juniors have to leave. Second, with standard promotion practices, again,
successful juniors become seniors, but unsuccessful juniors are offered to stay in the firm
and become seniors. We will show though that these ”unsuccessful” seniors (who were
unsuccessful as juniors) will receive a different fixed wage and status compared to their
successful colleagues of the same cohort. Also, in both systems, unproductive types will stay
outside of the firm.
The timing for a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
t = 0: A new cohort of workers are offered contracts that include a junior status level, a
fixed wage and an incentive wage for the first period. The firm also commits itself to
a second-period contract which includes a rule for allocating status, fixed wages and
incentive wages contingent on first-period performance. The firm also commits itself
whether to provide an employment guarantee or to fire unsuccessful seniors and replace
them by new juniors.
t = 0.5: Junior workers choose an effort level given all of the above.
t = 1: Outputs are observed, transfers occur and agents are promoted, retained or fired
according to the terms of the contract. Agents can quit voluntarily. New juniors enter
the firm.
t = 1.5: Senior workers choose an effort level according to their current monetary incentive
and status.
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t = 2: Outputs are observed, transfers occur, senior workers retire.
As the outcome qit which depends on effort at date t is random, some agents will be
successful and others not. Then an agent is characterized by its productivity b or g, and by
the fact that he is either a junior worker indexed 1, or a senior worker with a history of high
past performance, denoted h, or a history of low past performance, denoted l.
4. Solution of the model
4.1 Outside option
In each period agents can work as individual entrepreneurs outside the firm; agents have the
same kind of productivity inside and outside the firm. The only difference is that they work
individually and, therefore, they cannot change the status allocation in their one-person firm.
Hence, they also face different incentives. By virtue of assumption A.1, in a one-person firm,
the only feasible status allocation is constant. The value of s = 1 is due to the normalization
assumption that each worker is born with one unit of status. Note that we do not consider
the highly visible entrepreneurs here who become principals of large firms but individuals
working on their own in a one-person firm. The per-period utility of a self-employed is
EUit = q + eit∆q − ai e
2
it
2
.
A self-employed agent will choose the optimal effort level ei =
∆q
ai
for all t. The resulting
expected utility is
EUit ≡ U i = q +
∆q2
2ai
. (3)
Since ab > ag, reservation utility is type-dependent with U g > U b.
4.2 Workers’ optimal effort choices
In the following, we assume that the firm is in steady state and consequently drop the
time index. We consider first the problem of a senior worker at date 1.5. This problem
is isomorphic in both promotion hierarchies, although the respective status allocations and
wages differ. We can thus save on notation in terms of the type of the hierarchy considered.
Let eip(sp, wp,∆wp) denote the optimal effort level of a senior worker of type i ∈ {g, b}
with status sp and compensation (wp,∆wp), where index p = l stands for low and h for high
past performance. The agent maximizes the following programme:
EUip = sp (eip∆wp + wp)− ai
e2ip
2
. (4)
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The first-order condition (which is sufficient) implies:
e∗ip = min
{
sp∆wp
ai
, 1
}
, p ∈ {h, l}. (5)
We consider next the problem of a junior worker of type i maximizing his expected utility,
at date t = 0.5. Agent i chooses his effort ei1 to solve:
EUi1 = s1(ei1∆w1 + w1) + ei1∆Ui − ai e
2
i1
2
. (6)
Here ∆Ui = EUih − U i in an up-or-out system, and ∆Ui = EUih − EUil for standard
promotion practices. The first-order condition (which is sufficient) implies:
e∗i1 = min
{
s1∆w1 + ∆Ui
ai
, 1
}
. (7)
We will restrict the analysis to the meaningful case in which there is an interior solution
with respect to effort. This can be guaranteed by assuming ag to be high and ∆q low enough
so that in equilibrium ei1 < 1 and eip ≤ 1:
ag ≥ 37.5q and ∆q ≤ 5q. (A.2)
4.3 Optimal incentive contracts without status differentiation
We here describe a benchmark case in which the firm relies only on monetary incentives.
Status allocation is constant and identical among workers so that si = 1 ∀i. Consider a single
period where the firm maximizes the expected profit function with respect to a fixed wage
and bonus allocation. Assuming a proportion x of good agents, the program is as follows:
max
wi,∆wi
Π = x (q − wg + eg(∆q −∆wg)) + (1− x) (q − wb + eb(∆q −∆wb)) (8)
subject to
wi ≥ 0, (LL)
ei = min
{
∆wi
ai
, 1
}
, (IC)
EUi = wi + ei∆wi − ai e
2
i
2
≥ U i = q +
∆q2
2ai
, i ∈ {g, b}. (IR)
LL stands for limited liability, IC is the incentive compatibility, and IR the individual
rationality constraint. In the program above we have implicitly assumed that the firm is
able to sort out workers of type b and g at zero cost.
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We can readily show that the optimal solution derived under this assumption is imple-
mentable under the more realistic framework of asymmetric information. Under assumption
A.2 we will get an interior solution for the effort so that ei =
∆wi
ai
. The IR constraint then
writes: EUi = wi +
∆w2i
2ai
≥ q + ∆q2
2ai
, i ∈ {g, b}. The firm’s objective function decreases with
wi so that the IR constraints bind. Substituting wi = q +
∆q2
2ai
− ∆w2i
2ai
in (8) and optimizing
with respect to ∆wi yields: ∆wi = ∆q so that wi = q ∀ i ∈ {g, b}. It is easy to check
that under assumption A.2 effort is lower than 1. This solution is implementable under
asymmetric information as workers become residual claimants of their work and the firm
makes zero profit on both types of workers. Given agents’ risk neutrality and the outside
option where workers receive all of the surplus they produce, the firm cannot do better than
this contract by postponing rewards. We next show that this result continues to hold in
a dynamic context, the optimal dynamic solution is simply the replication of the optimal
static solution. We focus on a steady-state solution.
Proposition 1 If status is not differentiated, the profit maximizing dynamic incentive con-
tract is independent of the type or seniority of workers: w = q and ∆w = ∆q. Both types of
workers are entering the firm, and the firm makes zero profit.
The proofs of this and all following results are derived in the Appendix. Notice that
Proposition 1 is in contrast to Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) who show that the optimal
dynamic contract displays memory. The reason is that they impose the reservation utility
to be zero, U = 0, implying that the individual rationality constraints of the workers never
bind. Consequently, in Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) the binding constraint is always the
limited liability (LL) one and workers are earning a rent. In a dynamic context, the principal
can extract part of this rent by introducing memory in the contract.
In our model, as the workers’ outside option depends on their productivity, their indi-
vidual rationality constraint binds, and the principal cannot improve on the static solution.
More generally and quite intuitively, the Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) memory result does
not hold when the worker is not earning a rent, i.e., when the reservation utility is suffi-
ciently high so that the individual rationality constraints of the workers bind. If the outside
option for agents is to work as individual entrepreneurs, the firm cannot make any profits
in a situation without status incentives. Consequently, in order for a firm to be able to earn
profits, this must be owing to status considerations, as we show in what follows.
4.4 Two types of promotion hierarchy
We present two propositions describing the wages in the up-or-out system, and with standard
promotion practices. We then investigate under what conditions either one or the other is
optimal for the firm. While be build on the main result in Auriol and Renault (2008),
namely that juniors receive zero wages and status, our interest is to investigate the precise
shapes of the promotion hierarchy, and to predict under what circumstances either of the
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two promotion systems is optimal. We also show that a promotion hierarchy induces less
productive types to stay outside of the firm (which increases profits).
In the up-or-out system, the firm maximizes expected output minus wages, subject to the
ex ante participation constraint of the good worker, and the interim participation constraint
of a successful worker to be satisfied. The firm also faces the status feasibility constraint
(A.1) and limited liability constraints. The following Proposition fully characterizes the
optimal up-or-out system.
Proposition 2 In an up-or-out system, unsuccessful former juniors must leave the firm,
while successful juniors are promoted. The optimal up-or-out contract induces sorting, that
is, only the good workers apply for jobs in the firm. Wages and status allocation are as
follows: (i) junior workers receive minimum rewards and status wU1 = 0,∆w
U
1 = 0, s
U
1 = 0;
(ii) successful seniors receive wUh =
2
√
agUg
sUh
− sUh ∆q
2
2ag
+
Ug
sUh
, ∆wUh = ∆q, s
U
h = 1 +
1
2
√
ag
Ug
.
The up-or-out hierarchy provides strong incentives to junior workers. By bundling social
and material rewards in one state of the world, large firms create prizes for their workers
who are willing to take the gamble to get the prestigious and lucrative promotion. They
work harder than in self employment (eU1g = 2
√
Ug
ag
= 2
√
q
ag
+ ∆q
2
2a2g
> eg =
∆q
ag
) in the hope
to stay on board and receive a substantial increase in status and high wages. The principal
actually loses money on the promoted seniors, but this loss is more than compensated by
the surplus he extracts from the juniors. A large firm that offers an up-or-out hierarchy
engineers promotion packages that combine social and material rewards, and, through this
packaging, makes profits.
A promotion hierarchy also makes it possible to sort out at no cost the most productive
workers. Indeed, in up-or-out promotion systems social and monetary rewards are not only
delayed in time, as in any promotion system, but they are allocated only to successful
employees. With such a structure, workers with low ability are less likely to get a reward for
their effort. They rather stick to self-employment. The ability to attract the most productive
workers and to extract a high level of effort from them creates a competitive edge for large
firms.
The program with standard promotion practices has one main difference compared to the
up-or-out system: with standard promotion practices, nobody is fired. Unsuccessful juniors
stay in the firm, but the firm differentiates status and wages of successful vs. unsuccessful
seniors. The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 3 With standard promotion practices, all workers stay in the firm. The opti-
mal contract with standard promotion practices induces sorting, that is, only the good workers
apply for jobs in the firm. Wages and status allocation are as follows: (i) junior workers re-
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ceive minimum rewards and status (wS1 = 0,∆w
S
1 = 0, s
S
1 = 0); (ii) successful seniors receive
wSh = w
S
l
√√√√√2ag
U g
+ 1,∆wSh = ∆q, s
S
h =
2
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1
1 +
√
2Ug
ag
(√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1− 1
) ; (9)
and (iii) unsuccessful seniors receive
wSl =
U g
sSl
− s
S
l ∆q
2
2ag
,∆wSl = ∆q, s
S
l =
2
1 +
√
2Ug
ag
(√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1− 1
) . (10)
Unsuccessful seniors receive a lower status compared to their successful counterparts. A
firm with standard promotion practices loses money on both types of seniors; the loss is
more than compensated by the surplus extracted from the juniors.
Both up-or-out and standard promotion induce sorting and in both promotion hierarchies,
juniors only receive incentives linked to promotion. Seniors have first best incentives; they
receive the entire surplus associated with a success. Comparing the profits of the firm, we
can answer the question of optimality of the two systems in the next Proposition. The two
threshold levels ∆l ∼ 2.07 and al ∼ 182.95 are derived in the proof.
Proposition 4 A firm’s optimal choice between up-or-out or standard promotion practices
depends on the payoff associated to a success ∆q, and the difficulty of achieving a success
for the productive workers ag: (i) if ∆q is sufficiently large compared to q (
∆q
q
≥ ∆l), then,
up-or-out is optimal; (ii) if ∆q
q
< ∆l and ag sufficiently large compared to q (
ag
q
≥ al), then,
again up-or-out is optimal; (iii) otherwise, standard promotion practices are optimal.
To understand the intuition for the result, consider first a one-period setting. If effort
levels were contractible, the firm would like to make the most of the complementarity between
status and income and concentrate both on one sole worker. The firm would then offer
each agent the participation in a lottery where only one winner receives positive status and
income. However, status is assigned at the beginning of the period when each worker is given
his initial position in the firm’s hierarchy. Thus, if effort is not contractible, a worker who
has received zero status cannot be induced to work. With moral hazard, a lottery solution
is therefore not optimal. The firm could, however, still differentiate status among workers
to some extent. Giving some agents more status than others would induce the former to
work more. But because the cost of effort is convex, differentiation does not pay off in a
one-period setting and the firm optimally gives the same status and compensation scheme
to each worker (Auriol and Renault, 2008, Proposition 2). Without status redistribution,
the firm cannot make positive profits in a one-period setting. The case of senior workers in
the second period of our model who will retire at the end of the period corresponds to this
one-period situation. Differentiation thus comes at a cost and can only be optimal when it
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induces the juniors to work harder in the first period. This logic also applies to a dynamic
setting in which the principal has no possibility to commit him or herself to contractual
arrangements.
In a dynamic setting with contractual commitment, other allocations of status are opti-
mal. Consider our two-period setting. Workers are not earning a rent in our model and thus
juniors inside the firm receive the same expected utility as if they were working for two pe-
riods in self-employment. However, the intergenerational redistribution of status allows the
firm to make positive profits. By bundling high status and high income in the same state of
nature, it exploits the complementarity between status and income in workers’ preferences
and lowers the total wage bill. Wages and status are shifted to the second period of the
professional life to provide the workers with incentives to work, explaining the backloaded
structure of the dynamic incentive scheme.
Given the backloaded structure, the choice between both hierarchies builds on the distinct
advantages of each of them: At first glance, it would seem that up-or-out is always preferable
because it offers steeper incentives to juniors. This is indeed one of the main advantages
of an up-or-out system. In addition, the firm saves on the payment for the unsuccessful
seniors who have to leave the firm and work self-employed. Taken together, when incentives
should be strong because success is important (∆q is sufficiently large) or hard to achieve
(ag sufficiently large compared to q), up-or-out is optimal.
However, the problem with an up-or-out hierarchy is that the ”loser prize” for the unsuc-
cessful seniors cannot be adjusted by the firm. In particular, in our model no status can be
transferred to or from the individuals who have to leave. Thus, consider a situation where
incentives are of little importance because a low effort is optimal (either because achieving
a high output is easy or because ∆q is low). Then, a firm with standard promotion prac-
tices can make the most of the complementarity between status and income by giving all
juniors no status and a zero wage and distributing status and income fairly evenly between
all seniors with only a low differentiation based on success (i.e., by implementing some kind
of promotion by seniority system). In contrast, because of the low prize for the losers in
the up-or-out system, the firm would need to give a higher status and income to successful
seniors to fulfill the participation constraint. Juniors would then spend more effort than
needed which has to be compensated by the firm. Therefore, when incentives to juniors are
less important, standard promotion practices are preferable.
5. Implications and discussion
The last Proposition establishes that the up-or-out system dominates when the surplus
generated by high effort is sufficiently large and whenever the difficulty of achieving a success
is sufficiently large. This is in line with casual observations that up-or-out dominates in fields
in which there are large sums at stake or in which people have to work very hard to succeed.
This is also in line with the findings in Levin and Tadelis (2005) on partnerships and up-
or-out contracts that prevail when success (or quality) is of high importance. Examples
include law firms or consulting firms in which winning a law suit or a new, important client
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makes all the difference and people work both intensively and extensively, in particular when
fighting for partnership status. But this also is in line with the arts, as for example in the
music business where the “up” consists in a long-term contract with a publishing house, or
in science where the “up” is getting tenure. In many (but not all) countries scientists are
used to be granted tenure only after six to ten years on the job, and not making tenure at a
prestigious university is perceived as a substantial loss in expected status.
There are a number of observations and predictions. The first relates to the wage and
status profiles over time. Juniors who enter the up-or-out system have a higher variance in
terms of both status and wages than with standard promotion practices: successful seniors
are promoted to jobs with high wages and high status, while unsuccessful seniors leave to
self-employment. With standard promotion practices both wage and status profiles are less
steep than under up-or-out. Most importantly, unsuccessful seniors stay in the firm and
enjoy positive status. Nonetheless, in both systems, juniors are paid minimum wages and
receive no status.
A second observation builds on a comparison of effort levels of juniors. Omitting the
subscript for the type of worker, because only g type workers enter the firm, this is eU1 =
2
√
Ug
ag
in up-or-out, compared to eS1 =
√
2Ug
ag
with standard promotion practices. Thus, we
have eS1 =
1√
2
eU1 ; hence juniors work harder under an up-or-out contract. This seems to
be in line with casual evidence, whereby junior employees in industries that use up-or-out
contracts such as consulting, law, or investment banking, are reputed to work harder than
junior employees in industries that use standard promotion practices.
Third, effort of seniors is eUh = s
U
h
∆q
ag
with up-or-out and eSh = s
S
h
∆q
ag
or eSl = s
S
l
∆q
ag
with
standard promotion practices. We have 1 ≤ sSl ≤ 2 ≤ sSh . Therefore, successful seniors work
harder than unsuccessful seniors with standard promotion practices. However, for the high
performers of the past in the two systems, the comparison is not as clear cut. We can have
sUh R sSh . Therefore, seniors in the top position of a firm with standard promotion practices
(e.g. c-level executives in large industrial companies) may work harder than seniors in a firm
that employs up-or-out contracts.
A fourth prediction applies to the structure of the hierarchy in terms of the ratio between
juniors and seniors, the span of control. As juniors work harder in an up-or-out hierarchy,
there are more successful seniors than with standard promotion practices, but not everyone
succeeds. Unsuccessful seniors are replaced by new juniors, while for standard promotion
practices, the unsuccessful seniors stay on. As a consequence, the ratio of juniors and
unsuccessful seniors over successful seniors with standard promotion practices is larger than
the ratio of juniors over seniors in an up-or-out organization. A Web Appendix contains an
illustration of this prediction employing data from U.S. and French economics departments.
Our model can also at least partially rationalize some of the transformations of the large
law firms that over the last decades have changed their promotion systems away from pure
up-or-out contracts. Many of them now also employ permanent lawyers who are not partners
(Galanter and Palay, 1991) and thus have moved toward standard promotion practices.
Gorman (1999) discusses three factors that lead to this change and examines these factors
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empirically. Ghosh and Waldman (2010) show that their model is consistent with two of
these factors. In particular, an increase in the complexity of legal work in the 1980s has
led to an increase in the required firm specific human capital. As we will argue below,
the resulting shift to standard promotion practices is also in line with our model.11 Our
model is also in line with the third factor examined by Gorman (1999): a shift in values. In
particular, she argues that, traditionally, collegiality norms have played an important role
in large law firms, implying that all senior employees should be “equal in status” (Gorman,
1999, p. 646). A shift in values challenged this equality norm and paved the way for
standard promotion practices with status differentiation among seniors. This is consistent
with the main interest of our theory that status concerns are an important driver in the
choice of promotion system. More specifically, ruling out status differentiation between
senior workers would in our model also favor up-or-out contracts. The reason is that on
the one hand wage differentiation between workers of equal status is not optimal because
of the complementarity between status and income, and on the other hand without any
differentiation juniors cannot be induced to work. Thus, if all seniors are required to
have the same status, up-or-out contracts can fulfill this restriction while still giving high
incentives to juniors.
We would like to conclude with a remark about the impact of firm-specific human capital
on the optimal promotion system. While the model of Kahn and Huberman (1988) predicts
that up-or-out should prevail when firm-specific human capital is important, the model
of Ghosh and Waldman (2010) predicts the opposite. Introducing human capital in our
framework would mean that seniors become more efficient over time because they acquire
human capital. The acquisition of human capital does not affect successful seniors who
will always work for the firm, and a fortiori do so when human capital is specific to the
firm. However, human capital acquisition could shift the optimality of up-or-out versus
standard promotion practices, because in up-or-out, the firm would lose productive senior
workers and would need to replace them by less productive juniors. Put differently, under
standard promotion practices, less useful firm-specific capital is lost for reasons of providing
steep incentives. Depending on the importance of human capital for production, up-or-out
could altogether vanish. In any case, the threshold levels (both in terms of the difficulty of
achieving and of the returns to a success) would shift, making standard promotion practices
more likely. This is in line with the theoretical results in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) and
with empirical evidence in Gorman (1999).
6. Concluding remarks
We have suggested a simple dynamic agency model in which firms can make profits by
offering promotion opportunities to successful juniors. The hierarchies differ with respect
11The second factor discussed in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) is that client relationships have become less
important leading to low- and high-level jobs in law firms becoming less similar. Given that in our model
juniors and seniors conduct the same type of work, our model cannot account for this factor.
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to the treatment of unsuccessful juniors. In up-or-out, these unsuccessful juniors must go,
while with standard promotion practices they can stay. We have shown that these promotion
hierarchies both succeed in inducing sorting: only the more productive workers want to work
in these organizations. We have shown that up-or-out is the profit maximizing promotion
hierarchy for very high payoffs of successful work of juniors and when the task is causing
high costs of effort, while otherwise standard promotion practices dominate. Finally, we
have derived some testable implications. A Web Appendix presents some descriptive data
from the French and the U.S. university system in line with our theory.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We focus on a steady-state solution so that the contracts are independent of time. More-
over, we first neglect the problem of asymmetric information, assuming that the principal
can observe workers’ types. We then show that the solution obtained under this assump-
tion is implementable under the more realistic framework of asymmetric information. Let
∆Ui = EUih − EUil. When she is not differentiating status, under complete information
about workers types, the principal optimizes independently for each type of agent i = g, b
the following objective function:
max Π = q−wi1+ei1(∆q−∆wi1)+ei1
(
q−wih+eih(∆q−∆wih)
)
+(1−ei1)
(
q−wil+eil(∆q−∆wil)
)
s.t. wik ≥ 0, k = 1, h, l (LL)
eik = min
{
∆wik
ai
, 1
}
k = h, l ei1 = min
{
∆wi1 + ∆Ui
ai
, 1
}
(ICk)
EUik = wik + eik∆wik − ai e
2
ik
2
≥ U i = q +
∆q2
2ai
k = h, l. (IRk)
EUi1 = wi1 + ei1(∆wi1 + ∆Ui)− ai e
2
i1
2
≥ 2U i = 2q +
∆q2
ai
(IR1)
We focus on an interior solution for effort. We will check later that the optimal contract leads
to interior solutions under assumption A.2. Substituting eik =
∆wik
ai
and ei1 =
∆wi1+∆Ui
ai
in
(IRk) and (IR1) yields: EUik = wik +
∆w2ik
2ai
≥ U i = q + ∆q
2
2ai
for k = h, l and EUi1 =
wi1 +
(∆wi1+∆Ui)
2
2ai
≥ 2U i = 2q + ∆q
2
ai
. The principal’s objective function decreases with the
rent she leaves to the workers. The only reason she mights leave a rent to senior workers is to
provide incentives for junior workers. What matters for juniors’ incentives is the difference
in utility they will receive in the future depending on whether they succeed or fail: ∆Ui =
EUih − EUil. It is thus optimal to minimize payment to previously unsuccessful workers:
EUil = wil +
∆w2il
2ai
= q + ∆q
2
2ai
. We deduce that wil = q +
∆q2
2ai
− ∆w2il
2ai
. Similarly we have
EUih = ∆Ui +EUil so that wih = ∆Ui + q +
∆q2
2ai
− ∆w2ih
2ai
. Finally we deduce from (IR1) that
wi1 = 2q +
∆q2
ai
− (∆wi1+∆Ui)2
2ai
. The principal optimizes
Π = 2q−wi1 +ei1 (∆q −∆wi1 − (wih − wil) + eih(∆q −∆wih))+(1−ei1)eil(∆q−∆wil)−wil.
Substituting wi1, wil, wih − wil = ∆Ui − ∆w
2
ih−∆w2il
2ai
, ei1 and eik for k = h, l, yields:
Π = −q−∆q2
ai
− (∆q−(∆wi1+∆Ui))2
2ai
+ ∆wi1+∆Ui
ai
∆wih
2ai
(2∆q−∆wih)+(1−∆wi1+∆Uiai )
∆wil
2ai
(2∆q−∆wil)
One can readily see that ∆wi1 and ∆Ui are perfect substitutes in the principal objective
function. Optimizing the objective function with respect to ∆wik yields the FOC with
2∆q − 2∆wik = 0 for k = h, l. Under our assumptions it is easy to check that the objective
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function Π is concave in ∆wih and ∆wil for all ∆wi1 + ∆Ui ≥ 0. We deduce that at
the optimum ∆wih = ∆wil = ∆q. The principal optimizes next with respect to ∆Wi =
∆wi1+∆Ui the function Π = −q−∆q22ai −
(∆q−∆Wi)2
2ai
. We deduce that ∆Wi = ∆wi1+∆Ui = ∆q.
At the optimum the principal is indifferent in providing incentives to junior workers through
the bonus ∆wi1 = ∆q or through the difference in fixed wages between previously successful
and unsuccessful senior workers ∆Ui = wih − wil = ∆q. These two ways of motivating the
workers are perfect substitutes. Finally, we need to check that the solution satisfies eik ≤ 1
and ei1 ≤ 1. Both conditions are equivalent to ∆q ≤ ai. Since ag < ab, this is fulfilled given
assumption A.2. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that it is optimal for juniors to receive minimal wages and status: ∆wU1 =
wU1 = s
U
1 = 0. The proof is adapted from the proof of the first part of Proposition 3 in
Auriol and Renault (2008). We cannot apply it directly here as conditions A.1, A.2, and
A.3 in Auriol and Renault (2008) are not fully holding in the case we study here. Moreover,
Auriol and Renault (2001,2008) focus on standard promotion practices and rule out up-or-
out incentive schemes. This changes the proof. We show below that if the firm chooses to
offer different contracts to different types of workers, these contracts will be such that juniors
receive minimal wages and status. We avoid introducing additional notation by neglecting
here the index for possible different types of workers.
If sU1 = 0, then it is optimal to set w
U
1 = ∆w
U
1 = 0. Thus we need to show that s
U
1 = 0.
Suppose to the contrary that sU1 > 0. At some date t the principal may switch to a new
contract where the first term represents status, the second fixed wage, and the third bonus:
cU
′
1 = (0, 0, 0), c
U′
h =
sUh + sU1µ(eU1 ) ,
sUhw
U
h +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
(wU1 + µ(e
U
1 )∆w
U
1 )
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
,
sUh∆w
U
h
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
 .
If each generation from t on is offered these contracts, by construction whatever the
worker’s type the youngs’ expected intertemporal utility is held constant. Basically, the
youngs’ wages are transferred from the first to the second period while being divided by
the ratio of the original period 1 status to the new second period status
sU1
sU1
µ(eU1 )
+sUh
, so that
the increase in status exactly compensates for the decrease in income. On the other hand,
the utility of an old successful agent is increased by sU1 (
wU1
µ(eU1 )
+ ∆wU1 ). The utility of the
old unsuccessful agents is unchanged as it is their reservation utility. Furthermore, as the
overall incentives do not change, all effort levels are maintained. Let EwU1 = w
U
1 +µ(e
U
1 )∆w
U
1
and EwUh = w
U
h + µ(e
U
h )∆w
U
h be the expected wage bill for junior and senior workers in the
original contract and EwU
′
1 = 0, Ew
U ′
h =
sU1
µ(eU1 )
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
EwU1 +
sUh
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
EwUh in the new contract.
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It is straightforward to check that the intertemporal wage bill for each generation is lower:
that is µ(eU1 )
sU1
µ(eU1 )
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
EwU1 +
sUh
sUh +
sU1
µ(eU1 )
µ(eU1 )Ew
U
h < Ew
U
1 + µ(e
U
1 )Ew
U
h . Hence, a steady state
with sU1 > 0 cannot be part of any optimal solution of up-or-out contracts.
Thus, juniors receive minimal wages and status. If A.2 holds, ag is such that in equilib-
rium eUg1 < 1 (i.e., ∆Ug < ag). The following Lemma establishes that e
U
gh =
sUh ∆w
U
h
ag
≤ 1.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, at the optimum: sUh∆w
U
h ≤ ag.
Proof. If ∆wUh >
ag
sUh
, then eUgh = 1. Let  = ∆w
U
h − agsUh and ∆w
U ′
h = ∆w
U
h − , and
wU ′h = w
U
h + . This implies e
U ′
gh = e
U
gh = 1, EUh = EU
′
h, and EΠ = EΠ
′.
By Lemma 1 eUih =
sUh ∆w
U
h
ai
, and by assumption eUi1 =
∆Ui
ai
< 1. This implies that EUih =
sUh
(
eUih∆w
U
h + w
U
h
)−ai eU2ih2 = (sUh ∆wUh )22ai +sUhwUh and EUi1 = eUi1∆Ui−ai eU212 = ∆U2i2ai with ∆Ui =
EUih − U i = (s
U
h ∆w
U
h )
2
2ai
+ sUhw
U
h − U i. Then ∂∆Ui∂wUh = s
U
h ;
∂∆Ui
∂∆wUh
=
s2h∆w
U
h
ai
; ∂∆Ui
∂sUh
=
sUh ∆w
U2
h
ai
+ wUh ;
and
(
2∆Ug
ag+∆Ug
)′
=
2ag∆U ′g
(ag+∆Ug)
2 .
The firm maximizes expected profits:
maxEΠ =
2
1 + eUg1
(
eUg1∆q + q
)
+
2eUg1
1 + eUg1
(
eUgh
(
∆q −∆wUh
)− wUh + q) (11)
= 2
(
eUg1
1 + eUg1
(
∆q + eUgh
(
∆q −∆wUh
)− wUh )+ q
)
(12)
subject to EUgh ≥ U g (IRgh), EUg1 = ∆U
2
g
2ag
≥ 2U g (IRg1), EUb1 = ∆U
2
b
2ab
< 2U b (IRb1),
2eUg1
1+eUg1
sUh = 2 (status feasibility), w
U
h ≥ 0 (LL), eUg1 = ∆Ugag (ICg1), eUgh =
sUh ∆w
U
h
ag
(ICgh) and
sUh∆w
U
h ≤ ag. The Lagrangian is:
L =
2∆Ug
ag + ∆Ug
(
∆q +
sUh∆w
U
h
ag
(
∆q −∆wUh
)− wUh)+2q+α((sUh∆wUh )22ag + sUhwUh − U g
)
+βg
(
∆U2g
2ag
− 2U g
)
+βb
(
2U b −
∆U2b
2ab
)
+γ
(
2− 2∆Ug
ag + ∆Ug
sUh
)
+λhw
U
h +h
(
ag − sUh∆wUh
)
Define D := ∆q+
sUh ∆w
U
h
ag
(∆q−∆wUh )−wUh − γsUh and B := 2Dag(ag+∆Ug)2 +βg
∆Ug
ag
+α. From the
Lagrangian, we derive the following conditions:
α ≥ 0; βg ≥ 0; βb ≥ 0; γ ≥ 0; λh ≥ 0; h ≥ 0. (13)
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α
(
EUgh − U g
)
= 0 (14)
βg
(
∆U2g
2ag
− 2U g
)
= 0 (15)
βb
(
2U b −
∆U2b
2ab
)
= 0 (16)
γ
(
2− 2∆Ug
ag + ∆Ug
sUh
)
= 0 (17)
λhw
U
h = 0 (18)
h
(
ag − sUh∆wUh
)
= 0 (19)
∂L
∂∆wUh
=
sUh∆w
U
h
ag
B − s
U
h∆w
U
h
a2b
βb∆Ub +
2∆Ug
(ag + ∆Ug) ag
(
∆q − 2∆wUh
)− h = 0 (20)
∂L
∂sUh
=
(
sUh∆w
U
h
ag
+
wUh
∆wUh
)
B −
(
sUh∆w
U
h
ab
+
wUh
∆wUh
)
βb
∆Ub
ab
+
2∆Ug
ag (ag + ∆Ug)
(
∆q −∆wUh
) − γ 2∆Ug
∆wUh (ag + ∆Ug)
− h = 0 (21)
∂L
∂wUh
= sUh
(
B − βb∆Ub
ab
)
− 2∆Ug
ag + ∆Ug
+ λh = 0 (22)
Depending on parameters different solutions can occur. We focus on the case where in
equilibrium:
wUh > 0 which implies λh = 0 (23)
βb = 0 which implies EUb1 < 2U b. (24)
After deriving the optimal contract, we will check that (23) is fulfilled in equilibrium, and
that (24) is implied by (23).
The following preliminary result is helpful:
Lemma 2 When at the optimum wUh > 0, then ∆w
U
h = ∆q.
Proof. Assume that at the optimum ∆wUh < ∆q while w
U
h > 0. Let  > 0 and ∆ > 0 be
such that wU ′h = w
U
h −  ≥ 0 and ∆wU ′h = ∆wUh + ∆ ≤ ∆q with EUgh = (
sUh ∆w
U
h )
2
2ag
+ sUhw
U
h =
EU ′gh =
(sUh ∆wU′h )
2
2ag
+ sUhw
U ′
h . Solving this equation yields  =
sUh
2ag
∆(2∆wUh + ∆). By
construction, the expected utility of a gh worker is unchanged. However the principal’s
profit changes: she pays ∆ more with probability eU ′gh =
(∆wUh +∆)s
U
h
ag
, but economizes . Her
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profit thus rises by the amount ∆pi = eU ′gh
(
∆q − ∆wU ′h
) − wU ′h − (eUgh(∆q − ∆wUh ) − wUh ).
Substituting for the new value of effort and wages yields: ∆pi = +
∆sUh
ag
(
∆q−2∆wUh −∆
)
=
sUh ∆
ag
(∆wUh +0.5∆)+
∆sUh
ag
(
∆q−2∆wUh−∆
)
. Since by construction, ∆wU ′h = ∆w
U
h +∆ ≤ ∆q,
then ∆pi =
sUh ∆
ag
(
∆q −∆wUh − 0.5∆
)
> 0.
The remainder of the proof proceeds in three steps. In step 1 we show h = 0
allowing us to derive preliminary functional forms for sUh and w
U
h . In step 2 we show βg > 0
implying that the (IRg1)-constraint is binding. This together with Lemma 2 gives the
contract in Proposition 2. In step 3 we show that the firm’s profit is positive given this
contract and that the solution satisfies (23) and (24) as well as eUg1 < 1, e
U
gh ≤ 1.
Step 1: To see h = 0 from (22), (23), and (24) we have s
U
h =
2∆Ug
B(ag+∆Ug)
. Using (20),
(23), (24) and Lemma 2 we get h = 0. Substituting h = 0, βb = 0 from (24), s
U
h =
2∆Ug
B(ag+∆Ug)
and ∆wUh = ∆q in (21) yields γ =
∆q2
ag
+
wUh
sUh
> 0. This implies in (17) that sUh =
ag+∆Ug
∆Ug
and
wUh =
ag
(sUh−1)sUh
− sUh ∆q
2
2ag
+
Ug
sUh
.
Step 2: Next we show βg > 0. First, we show βg
∆Ug
ag
+ α > 0. Substituting for B and
D in (20) and rearranging yields: βg
∆Ug
ag
+α = 2
(sUh )
2
(
1− ag
ag+∆Ug
(
∆qsUh
∆Ug
− 2− 2(s
U
h−1)
ag
U g
))
.
After some computations and given Assumption A.2 it can be shown that βg
∆Ug
ag
+ α > 0.
This implies βg > 0 and α = 0. Assume, to the contrary, α > 0. From (14) we have
EUgh = U g and thus ∆Ug = 0. Then, the individual rationality constraint (IRg1) with
∆U2g
2ag
≥ 2U g cannot be fulfilled. Given that α = 0, we must have βg > 0. Hence, ∆U
2
g
2ag
= 2U g
or ∆Ug = 2
√
agU g. We therefore have s
U
h = 1 +
1
2
√
ag
Ug
> 1. Substituting this value in wUh
from step 1 together with Lemma 2 yields the three conditions of Proposition 2.
Step 3: It needs to be shown that the firm’s profit is positive given these specifications.
We have piU =
2eUg1
1+eUg1
(
∆q − wUh
)
+ 2q. Substituting for sUh =
eUg1
1+eUg1
, profit is positive if
∆q
(
1 + eUg1
)− (eUg1)2 ag + (2eUg1+1)eUg1 ∆q22ag + 1+2eUg1eUg1 q > 0. A sufficient condition is ∆qq (1 + eUg1)−(
eUg1
)2 ag
q
+
1+2eUg1
eUg1
> 0. Let a = ag
q
and ∆ = ∆q
q
implying eUg1 =
√
2
a
√
2a+ ∆2. Then, A.2
becomes a ≥ 37.5 and ∆ ≤ 5. Thus, profit is positive if u (a,∆) = ∆ (1 + eUg1 (a,∆)) −(
eUg1
)2
(a,∆) a+
1+2eUg1(a,∆)
eUg1(a,∆)
> 0. As both ∂u(a,∆)
∂a
, ∂u(a,∆)
∂∆
> 0, it suffices to show that u (a,∆)
is positive for the lowest values a and ∆. We have u (37.5, 0) ∼ 1.06.
Finally, we need to check that the solution satisfies (23), (24) and eUg1 < 1, e
U
gh ≤ 1.
For (23) we obtain as a sufficient condition 2
√√(
qag +
∆q2
2
)
> ∆q√
ag
+ ∆q
2
√
1
q
. The LHS
is increasing in ag and the RHS decreasing. Given A.2, we can thus set ag = 37.5q. For
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∆q
q
< 5 (by A.2), the sufficient condition is fulfilled. Second, we check eUg1 < 1. This is
equivalent to ag > 2q
(
1 +
√
1 + ∆q
2
2q2
)
. According to A.2, ag ≥ 37.5q. Thus we have to show
37.5q > 2q
(
1 +
√
1 + ∆q
2
2q2
)
. This is equivalent to ∆q <
√
2
((
37.5
2
− 1)2 − 1)q ≈ 25q and
fulfilled given A.2. Third, we turn to (24). EUb1 < 2U b is equivalent to
(
sUh
)2 ( 1
ag
− 1
ab
)
>(
1
ag
− 1
ab
)
− 4
∆q2
(√
abq +
∆q2
2
−
√
agq +
∆q2
2
)
. The second term on the RHS is negative
since ab > ag. Thus, a sufficient condition is
(
sUh
)2 ( 1
ag
− 1
ab
)
>
(
1
ag
− 1
ab
)
, which is always
fulfilled since sUh > 2. Thus, a low-ability worker would never like to enter the firm. We
finish with eUgh ≤ 1 which is equivalent to a2g − 4ag∆q + 2∆q2 + a2g 2agq∆q2+2agq ≥ 0. A sufficient
condition for this to hold is ag ≥
(
2 +
√
2
)
∆q. Given assumption A.2 we have ag ≥ 37.5q
and thus have to show 37.5q ≥ (2 +√2)∆q. This is fulfilled since ∆q
q
< 5 by A.2. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 3 in Auriol and Renault (2001). However,
we here consider two types of agents, and identify a separating equilibrium with shutdown
of the less productive type (IRb1). By offering optimal incentive contracts the firm is able to
sort out at zero cost the most productive workers. As in the Proof of Proposition 2, we first
show that it is optimal for juniors to receive minimal wages and status: ∆wS1 = w
S
1 = s
S
1 = 0.
We avoid introducing additional notation by neglecting here the index for possible different
types of workers. The reasoning holds true for any type of worker.
If sS1 = 0, then it is optimal to set w
S
1 = ∆w
S
1 = 0. Thus the proof of the result amounts
to showing that any optimal contract is such that sS1 = 0. Suppose to the contrary that
sS1 > 0. At some date t the principal may switch to the new contract where the first term is
status, the second fixed wage, and the third bonus: cS
′
1 = (0, 0, 0);
c
S′
h =
(
sSh + s
S
1 ,
sShw
S
h + s
S
1 (w
S
1 + ∆w
S
1 )
sSh + s
S
1
,
sSh∆w
S
h
sSh + s
S
1
)
; cS
′
l =
(
sSl + s
S
1 ,
sSl w
S
l + s
S
1w
S
1
sSl + s
S
1
,
sSl ∆w
S
l
sSl + s
S
1
)
.
If each generation from t on is offered these contracts, by construction whatever the
worker’s type the young’s expected intertemporal utility is held constant. Basically, the
young’s wages are transferred from the first to the second period while being divided by the
ratio of the original period 1 status to the new second period status
sS1
sS1 +s
S
p
, p ∈ {l, h}, so
that the increase in status exactly compensates for the decrease in income. On the other
hand, the utility of an old agent is increased (by sS1w
S
1 for the l type and s
S
1 (w
S
1 + ∆w
S
1 )
for the h type). Furthermore, as the overall incentives do not change, all effort levels are
maintained. Let EwS1 = w
S
1 +µ(e
S
1 )∆w
S
1 , Ew
S
h = w
S
h+µ(e
S
h)∆w
S
h and Ew
S
l = w
S
l +µ(e
S
l )∆w
S
l
be the expected wage bill for junior and senior workers in the original contract and EwS
′
1 = 0,
EwS
′
h =
sSh
sSh+s
S
1
EwSh+
sS1
sSh+s
S
1
(wS1 +∆w
S
1 ), and Ew
S′
l =
sSl
sSl +s
S
1
EwSl +
sS1
sSl +s
S
1
wS1 in the new contract.
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It is straightforward to check that the intertemporal wage bill for each generation is lower.
Hence, a steady state with sS1 > 0 cannot be part of any optimal solution.
Let ∆Ui = EUih − EUil. The principal is maximizing expected profits:
maxEΠ = eSg1
(
∆q + eSgh
(
∆q −∆wSh
)− wSh)+(1−eSg1) (eSgh (∆q −∆wSl )− wSl )+2q (25)
subject to EUgl =
(sSl ∆w
S
l )
2
2ag
+ sSl w
S
l ≥ U g (IRgl), EUg1 = ∆U
2
g
2ag
+ EUgl ≥ 2U g (IRg1),EUb1 =
∆U2b
2ab
+ EUbl < 2U b (IRb1), 2 = e
S
g1s
S
h + (1 − eSg1)sSl (status feasibility), wSh ≥ 0; wSl ≥ 0
(LL), eSg1 =
∆Ug
ag
(ICg1), e
S
gp =
∆wSp s
S
p
ag
for p = l, h (ICgp), and s
S
h∆w
S
h ≤ ag; sSl ∆wSl ≤ ag.
Substituting the effort functions from (ICg1) and (ICgp), the Lagrangian is:
L =
∆Ug
ag
(
∆q +
sSh∆w
S
h
ag
(∆q −∆wSh )− wSh
)
+
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)(
sSl ∆w
S
l
ag
(
∆q −∆wSl
)− wSl )+ 2q
+ α
(
(sSl ∆w
S
l )
2
2ag
+ sSl w
S
l − U g
)
+ βg
(
∆U2g
2ag
+ EUgl − 2U g
)
+ βb
(
2U b −
∆U2b
2ab
− EUbl
)
+ γ
(
2− ∆Ug
ag
sSh −
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
sSl
)
+ λlw
S
l + λhw
S
h + h
(
ag −∆wShsSh
)
+ l
(
ag −∆wSl sSl
)
Define G := ∆q+
sSh∆w
S
h
ag
(
∆q −∆wSh
)−wSh− sSl ∆wSlag (∆q −∆wSl )+wSl +βg∆Ug−γ (sSh − sSl ) .
From the Lagrangian, we derive the following conditions:
α ≥ 0; βg ≥ 0; βb ≥ 0; γ ≥ 0;λl ≥ 0;λh ≥ 0; l ≥ 0; h ≥ 0
α
(
EUgl − U g
)
= 0 (26)
βg
(
∆U2g
2ag
+ EUgl − 2U g
)
= 0 (27)
βb
(
2U b −
∆U2b
2ab
− EUbl
)
= 0 (28)
γ
(
2− ∆Ug
ag
sSh −
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
sSl
)
= 0 (29)
λlw
S
l = 0; λhw
S
h = 0 (30)
h
(
ag −∆wShsSh
)
= 0; l
(
ag −∆wSl sSl
)
= 0 (31)
∂L
∂∆wSh
=
sSh∆w
S
h
a2g
G− s
S
h∆w
S
h
a2b
βb∆Ub +
∆Ug
a2g
(
∆q − 2∆wSh
)− h = 0 (32)
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∂L
∂sSh
=
(
sSh∆w
S
h
a2g
+
wSh
ag∆wSh
)
G−
(
sSh∆w
S
h
a2b
+
wSh
ab∆wSh
)
βb∆Ub
+
∆Ug
a2g
(
∆q −∆wSh
) − γ ( ∆Ug
ag∆wSh
)
− h = 0 (33)
∂L
∂∆wSl
=
sSl ∆w
S
l
ag
(
−G
ag
+ βg + α
)
− s
S
l ∆w
S
l
ab
βb
(
1− ∆Ub
ab
)
+(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)(
∆q − 2∆wSl
ag
)
− l = 0 (34)
∂L
∂sSl
=
(
sSl ∆w
S
l
ag
+
wSl
∆wSl
)(
−G
ag
+ βg + α
)
−
(
sSl ∆w
S
l
ab
+
wSl
∆wSl
)
βb
(
1− ∆Ub
ab
)
+
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
∆q −∆wSl
ag
− γ
∆wSl
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
− l = 0 (35)
∂L
∂wSh
= sSh
(
G
ag
− βb∆Ub
ab
)
− ∆Ug
ag
+ λh = 0 (36)
∂L
∂wSl
= sSl
(
−G
ag
+ βb
∆Ub
ab
+ βg − βb + α
)
−
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
+ λl = 0 (37)
Depending on parameters different solutions can occur. We focus on the case where in
equilibrium:
wSh > 0 and w
S
l > 0⇒ λh = λl = 0 (38)
βb = 0⇒ EUb1 < 2U b (39)
EUgl = U g ⇒ α > 0 (40)
βg > 0, which with α > 0, implies that ∆Ug =
√
2agU g and e
S
g1 =
√
2U g
ag
(41)
Note that with (40) we focus on the case where unsuccessful seniors receive only their reser-
vation utility, i.e., where the principal is setting incentives for juniors to work. It will be
checked that all these conditions are fulfilled at equilibrium and that condition (39) is implied
by (38).
The remainder of the proof proceeds in two steps. In step 1 we show h = l = 0.
This together with conditions (38) to (41) gives the contract in Proposition 3. In step 2
we show that the firm’s profit is positive given this contract and that the solution satisfies
conditions (38) to (41) as well as eSg1 < 1; e
S
gl, e
S
gh ≤ 1.
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Step 1: Lemma 2 derived in the Proof of Proposition 2 applies for wh and wl. From
(36), (38) and (39) we have sSh =
∆Ug
G
. From (32) and (39) we get ∆Ug
a2g
(
∆q −∆wSh
)
= h.
Similarly, from (34) and (37) we get:
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
1
ag
(
∆q −∆wSl
)
= l. Lemma 2 with (38)
then implies h = l = 0. Substituting (32) in (33) and applying (38) and (39) to (36), we
get γ =
wSh
sSh
+ ∆q
2
ag
.
From (36), (37) and (38) it follows that βg+α =
1
sSl
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
+ ∆Ug
agsSh
. Since ∆Ug
ag
= eSg1 < 1
we have βg + α > 0. Substituting βg + α in (34) and (35), we get γ =
wSl
sSl
+ ∆q
2
ag
. Equating
these two expressions for γ it follows that (sSh , s
S
l ) is such that:
wSh
sSh
=
wSl
sSl
. Moreover we have
γ > 0 so that ∆Ug
ag
sSh +
(
1− ∆Ug
ag
)
sSl = 2. Given these specifications as well as (40) and (41)
and using
wSh
sSh
=
wSl
sSl
and
(sSl ∆q)
2
2ag
+ sSl w
S
l = U g we get the solution in Proposition 3.
Step 2: It needs to be shown that the firm’s profit piS is positive given these specifications.
We have piS =eSg1
(
∆q − wSh
) − (1− eSg1)wSl + 2q. Using the fact that wShsSh = wSlsSl , this is
equivalent to: piS = 2q + eSg1∆q − wSl
(
1 + eSg1
sSh−sSl
sSl
)
. Since eSg1 =
√
2Ug
ag
and since sSh =
sSl
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1 we deduce that piS = 2q + eSg1∆q −wSl
{
1 +
√
2Ug
ag
(√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1− 1
)}
= 2q +
eSg1∆q− 2w
S
l
sSl
. Substituting wSl =
Ug
sSl
− sSl ∆q2
2ag
= q
sSl
+ ∆q
2
2agsSl
− sSl ∆q2
2ag
yields piS = 2q+eSg1∆q− 2w
S
l
sSl
=
eSg1∆q +
(
2q + ∆q
2
ag
)(
1− 1
(sSl )
2
)
> 0 since sSl > 1.
Finally, we need to check that the solution satisfies conditions (38) to (41), and eUg1 <
1, eSgl, e
S
gh ≤ 1. For (38) we show wSl > 0 which implies wSh = wSl
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1 > 0.
We need to show
Ug
sSl
>
sSl ∆q
2
2ag
. A sufficient condition is ag ≥ 32 ∆q
2
q
. Given assump-
tion A.2 we have ag ≥ 37.5q. We thus have to show 37.5 ≥ 32 ∆q
2
q2
. This is fulfilled
for ∆q
q
≤ 5 as given by assumption A.2. Second, condition (39) is satisfied if EUb1 =
1
2ab
(
∆q2
2ab
((
sSh
)2 − (sSl )2)+ sShwSh − sSl wSl )2 + (sSl ∆q)22ab + sSl wSl < 2U b. The condition sim-
plifies to
∆q2
(sSl )2
2
−1
+ ag
Ug
q−∆q2
2ag
(
(sSl )
2−1
)
+
(sSl )
2
∆q2
2
1
ab
2
q+ ∆q
2
2ag
(
(sSl )
2−1
) < ab. Since the LHS < ag and by
assumption ag < ab this condition is always fulfilled.
Next we check (41) by checking that βg > 0. Since ∆w
S
h = ∆w
S
l = ∆q we have G =
∆q − (wSh − wSl ) + βg∆Ug − γ
(
sSh − sSl
)
. Substituting γ =
wSh
sSh
+ ∆q
2
ag
=
(
wSl
sSl
+ ∆q
2
ag
)
yields
G = ∆q − 2(wSh − wSl ) − ∆q
2
ag
(
sSh − sSl
)
+ βg∆Ug. Let A =
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1 − 1. We have
wSh = (A + 1)w
S
l = (A + 1)
(
Ug
sSl
− sSl ∆q2
2ag
)
and sSh = (A + 1)s
S
l . Substituting these values
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in G yields G = ∆q − 2AUg
sSl
+ βg∆Ug. Moreover since βb = λh = 0 we deduce from (36)
that G = ∆Ug
sSh
, where ∆Ug =
√
2agU g. Combining both equations of G yields (i) βg =
1
sSh
+√
2Ug
ag
A
sSl
− ∆q√
2agUg
. We deduce that βg > 0 if and only if s
S
l ∆q <
√
2agUg
A+1
+2U gA. Substituting
A by its value, this inequality is equivalent to (ii) 2U g+s
S
l ∆q <
3
√
2agUg+2Ug√√
2ag
Ug
+1
. Dividing right
and left by U g and substituting U g by its value in
√
2ag
Ug
= 2a√
2a+∆2
, equation (ii) becomes(
1 +
sSl a
2a+∆2
∆
)2 (
1 + 2a√
2a+∆2
)
<
(
1 + 3a√
2a+∆2
)2
, with sSl =
2
1+
√
2a+∆2
a
(√
2a√
2a+∆2
+1−1
) . On can
check that this condition holds for all values of a and ∆ satisfying A.2. Thus, βg > 0.
We then check condition (40) by checking that α > 0. We have βg + α =
1
sSl
− ∆Ug
ag
sSh−sSl
sShs
S
l
so that α = 1
sSl
−
√
2Ug
ag
sSh−sSl
sShs
S
l
− βg. Substituting βg by its value from (i) above yields
α =
(
1−
√
2Ug
ag
)
sSh−sSl
sShs
S
l
−
√
2Ug
ag
A
sSl
+ ∆q√
2agUg
= A
(A+1)sSl
(
1−
√
2Ug
ag
(A+ 2)
)
+ ∆q√
2agUg
. Thus,
α > 0 if
√
ag
2Ug
+ A+1
A
sSl ∆q
2Ug
>A + 2. Inserting values for A,U g, and s
S
l gives
a√
2a+∆2
+√
2a√
2a+∆2
+1√
2a√
2a+∆2
+1−1
2a
1+
√
2a+∆2
a
(√
2a√
2a+∆2
+1−1
) ∆
2a+∆2
>
√
2a√
2a+∆2
+ 1 + 1. One can check that this
inequality holds for all values of a and ∆ satisfying A.2. Thus, α > 0.
Next, we show eSg1 < 1. This is fulfilled since
√
2eSg1 = e
U
g1 < 1. We finish with e
S
gh =
sSh∆q
ag
< 1 which implies eSgl =
sSl ∆q
ag
< 1. We have to have ag > s
S
h∆q which is equivalent to
ag−
√
2agU g+
√
2agU g
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1 > 2∆q
√√
2ag
Ug
+ 1. Given eSg1 < 1 we have ag >
√
2agU g.
A sufficient condition is thus
√
2agU g ≥ 2∆q which is true as shown above for condition
(38). QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Profit with up-or-out is higher than profit with standard promotion practices if and only
if:
2eUg1
1 + eUg1
(
∆q − wUh
)
+ 2q > eSg1
(
∆q − wSh
)− (1− eSg1)wSl + 2q (42)
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Defining ∆Π as the difference in profits between up-or-out and standard promotion practices
and using that eSg1 =
1√
2
eUg1, we find
∆Π =
2eUg1
1 + eUg1
(
∆q − wUh
)− eUg1√
2
(
∆q − wSh
)
+
(
1− e
U
g1√
2
)
wSl . (43)
Using from Proposition 2 eUg1 =
√
2
√
2Ug
ag
and from Proposition 3 wSh = w
S
l
√
2
√
2
eUg1
+ 1 and
sSl =
2
1+
eUg1√
2
(√
2
√
2
eUg1
+1−1
) we obtain:
∆Π =
(
2eUg1
1 + eUg1
− e
U
g1√
2
)
∆q − 2e
U
g1
1 + eUg1
wUh + 2
wSl
sSl
.
Furthermore, we have from Proposition 2 wUh =
(eUg1)
2
1+eUg1
ag − (2e
U
g1+1)
eUg1(1+eUg1)
∆q2
2ag
+
eUg1
1+eUg1
q and from
Proposition 3 wSl =
(eUg1)
2
4sSl
ag − s
S
l ∆q
2
2ag
. Hence,
∆Π =
(
2eUg1
1+eUg1
− eUg1√
2
)
∆q +
eU2g1
(1+eUg1)
2
ag
8
[(
1 +
eUg1√
2
(√
2
√
2
eUg1
+ 1− 1))2 (1 + eUg1)2 − 16(eUg1 + Ugag )].
(44)
In a way similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we re-scale the problem in function of q with
a = ag
q
and ∆ = ∆q
q
. Given A.2 we have a ≥ 37.5 and ∆ ≤ 5. Then,
eUg1 =
√
2
a
√
2a+ ∆2 ∈
(
0,
10
√
2
37.5
]
.
It is straightforward to check that eUg1 is decreasing and convex in a, and that it is increasing
and convex in ∆. It hence reaches its maximum for a = 37.5 and ∆ = 5. Equation (44) is
equivalent to
∆Π(a,∆)
q
=
(
2eUg1
1+eUg1
− eUg1√
2
)
∆ +
eU2g1
(1+eUg1)
2
a
8
[(
1 +
eUg1√
2
(√
2
√
2
eUg1
+ 1− 1))2 (1 + eUg1)2 − 16(eUg1 + 1a + ∆22a2 )].
(45)
Let ∆pi(a,∆) = ∆Π(a,∆)
q
. Note that independently from ∆ ∈ [0, 5], lima→+∞∆pi > 0 as
lima→+∞
(
eUg1
)2 a
8
= 1
2
. By continuity it is still true for lower values of a. When a is very
large so that success is difficult, the firm’s profit is always higher with up-or-out than with
standard promotion practices.
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We now prove that for low values of ∆ it exists al (∆) > 37.5 such that ∆pi(a,∆) ≥ 0 if
and only if a ≥ al (∆). Let f (a,∆) =
(
1 +
eUg1√
2
(√
2
√
2
eUg1
+ 1− 1
))2 (
1 + eUg1
)2
and d (a,∆) =
4
√
2∆
a
(1 + eUg1)
2
√
2−1−eUg1
eUg1
. From (45) ∆pi(a,∆) > 0 with a ≥ 37.5 and ∆ ∈ (0, 5] is equivalent
to
f
(
eUg1(a,∆)
)
+ d(a,∆) > 16
(
eUg1 (a,∆) +
1
a
+
∆2
2a2
)
. (46)
This part of the proof proceeds in two steps. In step 1 we consider the case ∆ = 0
and show that there exists a unique al (0) > 37.5. In step 2: we consider the case ∆ > 0.
We show that there is a critical value ∆l such that for all ∆ < ∆l it exists al(∆) > 37.5 so
that ∆pi ≥ 0 if and only if a ≥ al(∆). To conclude we show that for all ∆ > ∆l we have
∆pi > 0 for all a ≥ 37.5.
Step 1: Consider the case ∆ = 0 so that eUg1 =
2√
a
and d(a,∆) = 0. From (46)
∆Π > 0 is equivalent to f
(
2√
a
)
> 16
(
2√
a
+ 1
a
)
. The functions f
(
2√
a
)
and 16
(
2√
a
+ 1
a
)
can cross only once, twice or none because they are both decreasing and convex in a. Since
f
(
2√
37.5
)
< 16
(
2√
37.5
+ 1
37.5
)
, while lim
a→+∞
f
(
2√
a
)
= 1 > lim
a→+∞
16
(
2√
a
+
1
a
)
= 0 they
cross once. There is a unique al > 37.5 so that ∆pi ≥ 0 if and only if a ≥ al. We have
al ∼ 182.95 for ∆ = 0.
Step 2: We now turn to the case ∆ > 0. One can check after tedious computations
that for all ∆ ∈ (0, 5], f (eUg1(a,∆)) and d(a,∆) are decreasing and convex in a ≥ 37.5.
Therefore, f
(
eUg1(a,∆)
)
+d(a,∆) is decreasing and convex in a. We can thus apply the same
reasoning as before. Since lim
a→+∞
∆pi(a,∆) > 0 ∀∆ ∈ [0, 5], we just need to show that it exists
a ∆l > 0 so that ∆pi(37.5,∆) < 0 ∀∆ < ∆l. The function ∆pi(37.5,∆) is continuous in ∆.
Moreover ∆pi(37.5, 0) < 0 while ∆pi(37.5, 5) > 0 so that there is at least one ∆l ∈ (0, 5] so
that ∆pi(37.5,∆) = 0. The following graph of ∆pi(37.5,∆) shows that ∆l is unique with
∆l ∼ 2.07.
Figure 1 about here.
Finally, note that by construction ∆pi(37.5,∆) < 0 for all ∆ < ∆l. Hence, for all ∆ < ∆l
it exists al(∆) > 37.5 so that ∆pi ≥ 0 if and only if a ≥ al(∆). The following graph shows
that for ∆ > ∆l we have ∆pi > 0 for all a ≥ 37.5.
Figure 2 about here.
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Figure 1
Figure 2
